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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:43 pm
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Results for juvenile courts (tennessee)
1 results foundAuthor: U.S. Department of Justice. Civil Rights Division Title: Investigation of the Shelby County Juvenile Court Summary: More than 40 years ago, the Supreme Court established the parameters of due process for children facing delinquency proceedings and thereby subject to the “awesome prospect of incarceration.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). The Court held that children must be afforded the right to counsel, the right to notice of the charges, the right to be free from self-incrimination, and the right to confront witnesses. Gault, 387 U.S. 1. The year before Gault, the Supreme Court held that a child facing the possibility of a transfer to adult criminal court must be accorded the protections of due process, including a hearing, the right to representation by counsel, access to the evidence considered in determining the waiver, and, where the court waives its jurisdiction, a statement of the reasons for transfer on the record. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-62 (1966). In Shelby County, it is JCMSC’s obligation to ensure that due process principles are met. JCMSC must also administer justice in a non-discriminatory manner that comports with equal protection and does not result in discriminatory impacts that violate Title VI. We find that JCMSC fails to provide constitutionally required due process to children of all races. In addition, we find that JCMSC’s administration of justice discriminates against Black1 We have reasonable cause to believe that JCMSC fails to ensure due process for all children appearing for delinquency proceedings. children. Further, we find that JCMSC violates the substantive due process rights of detained youth by not providing them with reasonably safe conditions of confinement. • JCMSC fails to provide timely and adequate notice of charges to children appearing on delinquency matters by not providing petitions of their charges prior to their detention hearings or even, in many cases, before the adjudicatory hearing (the juvenile equivalent of a trial). This violates the requirement that notice be provided “sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded.” Gault, 387 U.S. at 33. • JCMSC fails to protect children from self-incrimination during probation conferences by (1) failing to advise juveniles of their Miranda rights prior to questioning them about the facts underlying their charges; (2) not obtaining informed waivers of those rights before asking the children to divulge potentially incriminating statements about their charges; and (3) eliciting self-incriminating statements in the absence of Miranda warnings and informed waivers. This is contrary to Gault’s holding that “the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults.” Id. at 55. • JCMSC fails to hold timely probable cause hearings for children arrested without a warrant by failing to hold detention hearings on weekends and holidays. When a person has been arrested without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment requires that a judicial officer must determine that probable cause exists to believe the person has committed a crime in order for the state to continue the person’s detention. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1974). In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991), the Court held that probable cause determinations must be made within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest. Children at JCMSC experience extended detentions because the court has no procedure in place to hold detention hearings on weekends, extended holiday weekends, and holidays. For example, JCMSC detained 815 children over a five-year period for three days or more before their probable cause hearings. • JCMSC fails to provide adequate due process protections for children before transferring them to the adult criminal court. We observed hearings and reviewed transcripts in which Magistrates made transfer decisions after making cursory inquiries (and in some cases no inquiries) into the child’s background, after failing to hold a waiver hearing, or after asking the child to self-incriminate. This violates the minimal requirement that transfer proceedings “must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Kent, 383 U.S. at 562. We also have reason to believe that JCMSC engages in conduct that violates the constitutional guarantee of Equal Protection and federal laws prohibiting racial discrimination, including Title VI. We retained a leading, nationally recognized, expert on measuring disparities in the juvenile justice system through statistical analysis. Statisticians in the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) Office of Justice Program’s Bureau of Justice Statistics and National Institute of Justice peer reviewed the expert’s work. The expert used two methodologies to make this determination. First, he reviewed JCMSC’s Relative Rate Index (“RRI”), the reporting mechanism required by DOJ’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (“OJJDP”).2 2 Our consultant was one of the developers of the RRI mechanism. The RRI compares Disproportionate Minority Contact in Shelby County with other counties throughout the nation. Our consultant also examined JCMSC’s case data – more than 66,000 files – over a five-year period to assess the outcomes throughout the different phases of a case, using odds ratio and logistic regression techniques. These techniques track the odds that a child’s case will be handled in a specific way at different decision points in the juvenile court process. The cases range from misdemeanor offenses, such as trespassing, to serious felony offenses, such as murder. Both methods show that Black children are disproportionately represented in almost every phase of the Shelby County juvenile justice system, including pre-trial detention and transfers to criminal court. Moreover, the data shows that in certain phases of the County’s juvenile justice system, race is – in and of itself – a significant contributing factor, even after factoring in legal variables (such as the nature of the charge and prior record of delinquency) and social variables (such as age, gender, and school attendance). • The statistical analysis shows that Black children in Shelby County are less likely to receive the benefits of more lenient judicial and non-judicial options. While we found that the impact of some legal and social factors reduced the impact of race, race was still a statistically significant factor in determining whether a child would receive lenient treatment (such as a warning) as opposed to more serious sanctions. Specifically, Black children were one third less likely to receive a warning than White children, even after accounting for other factors such as prior contacts with the court, the severity of the charges, gender, and education. • We also found a disparity in the initial detention of Black children as compared to White children. The case data showed that a Black child was more than twice as likely to be detained as a White child. This number remained unchanged after accounting for other legal and social factors. • We also found a substantial disparity in the rates of transfers to adult court. The RRI shows that JCMSC transfers Black children to adult criminal court more than two times as often than White children. Analysis of the case files shows that Black children in JCMSC have a greater odds ratio (2.07) of being considered for transfer to the criminal court and have a substantially higher chance of having their case actually transferred to the criminal court. Even after accounting for other variables including the types of offenses, prior offenses, age, and gender, the odds ratio associated with race was only slightly reduced to 2.02. This disproportionate impact cannot be explained by factors other than race. Our investigation also included a review of JCMSC’s detention facility. There we found several violations to the children’s substantive due process rights to reasonably safe conditions of confinement and freedom from undue bodily restraints. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982). In particular, JCMSC subjects children at the detention center to unnecessary and excessive restraint, including use of restraint chairs and pressure point control tactics. These restraints endanger the safety of the children detained in the facility. JCMSC has recently informed us that it is taking steps to resolve these excessive restraint issues. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 2012. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 27, 2012 at: http://www.memphisdailynews.com/Editorial_Images/13516.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.memphisdailynews.com/Editorial_Images/13516.pdf Shelf Number: 125079 Keywords: Disparities in Juvenile Justice ProcessingDue ProcessJuvenile Court TransfersJuvenile Courts (Tennessee)Juvenile Offenders |